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INSURANCE LAW IN MISSOURI*
ROBERT

E.

SEILER"*

There have been nine decisions by the Supreme Court in the period
under review dealing directly or indirectly with substantive questions of
insurance law, all of which are of interest to the lawyer in general practice.
In Hall v. Weston,' the court held that for enforcement of an automobile liability insurance policy (the policy not containing a declaration that
the named insured fully owned the described automobile), there is no need
for the insured to show ownership or insurable interest in the vehicle, that
the risk insured against is based on use, not ownership of property. The case
also holds that notice to the local agent by telephone is sufficient notice to
the company of a newly acquired automobile.
In Brown v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,2 the court reversed the St.
Louis Court of Appeals and held that medical testimony that a combination
of vile language and a hard pushing motion could with reasonable medical
certainty be considered the events which precipitated a fatal coronary
occlusion, was sufficient to support liability for accidental death benefits.
The fact that the deceased already had heart trouble did not relieve the
insurer.
In O'Hare v. Pursell,3 the plaintiffs were insureds under a public liability
insurance policy issued by the ill-fated Insurance Company of Texas and
personally paid $15,516.97 in satisfaction of judgments obtained by parties
injured in an accident. The plaintiffs then sought to recover the amounts
paid from the reinsurer. This the court held the plaintiffs could do, despite
the fact that ordinarily a contract of reinsurance is one of indemnity against
loss and creates no privity between the original insured and the reinsurer,
because under the terms of the particular reinsurance treaty here involved
the reinsurer contracted to indemnify against liability; thus the insureds
could proceed directly against the reinsurer.
*This Article contains a discussion of selected 1959 and 1960 Missouri Supreme
Court decisions appearing in volumes 323 through 332 of the Southwestern Reporter, Second Series.
**Attorney, Joplin, Missouri, LL.B., University of Missouri, 1935.
1. 323 S.W.2d 673 (Mo. 1959).
2. 327 S.W.2d 252 (Mo. 1959) (en banc).
3. 329 S.W.2d 614 (Mo. 1959).
(382)
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Clarke v. Organ,4 dealt primarily with the effect of the nonclaim probate statute on tort claims, but in rejecting an argument that the tort action involved should not be considered abated as against the liability insurer,
the court declared again that a final judgment against the insured is prerequisite to the enforcement of liability of the insurer.
In Steele v. Goosen,5 an automobile tort case, the court held that where
there is $50 deductible collision insurance and the plaintiff assigns his entire
claim for property damage to his insurer, the plaintiff is not the real party
in interest, even though he had received $50 less than the cost of repairs.
Therefore in these circumstances any action for the property damage must
be brought in the insurer's name.
In Magers v. National Life & Acc. Ins. Co.,6 there was presented a question of first impression in Missouri as to whether the cash surrender values
in lapsed industrial insurance policies could be assigned, where the policy
provided against assignment of "the policy or benefits thereunder." The
court held that the obligation of the company to pay cash surrender values
was absolute. Hence the claims were matured claims and the assignment
did not violate the policy provisions.
In Poland v. Fisher's Estate7 the court held that the claim of lack of
insurable interest, where the insurance company has paid the amount of the
policy to the person named therein, is not available to one of the adverse
claimants to the fund. The court also held that evidence that the deceased,
a livestock dealer, did a large volume of business regularly over a period of
years with the plaintiff in buying and selling livestock through use of
plaintiff's facilities at the stockyards, for which plaintiff received compensation and commissions of about $3,000 per month, justified the finding of the
trial court that plaintiff had an insurable interest in the life of the deceased.
In Pfingsten v. Franklin Life Ins. Co.,8 the court held that a provision
in a life policy that it would not take effect until the first premium was
paid, being for the benefit of the insurer, could be waived by an extension
of credit to the loan company which held the policy, where there was a
course of dealing between the insurer and the loan company whereby the
latter would add the premiums to the insured's monthly payments and remit
in due course to the insurer. On the question of whether plaintiff made a
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submissible case on the issue of whether the insured was in good health when
the policy was delivered, as required by the policy, the court held that
evidence that the insured was required to and did submit to a medical
examination" by the insurer's medical examiner, justified the assumption
and constituted substantial evidence that the examiner found the insured
in good health at that time (which was six days prior to the issuance of the
policy) and that introduction by the insurer of the death certificate and
hospital records containing statements to the contrary did not constitute
conclusive evidence, so that the issue of good health was a question for the
jury.
In Giokaris v. Kincaid,9 the court held that the insurance company's
exclusion clause as to the use of other automobiles was not ambiguous and
plainly excluded the use of any other automobile owned by the insured or a
member of the same household or furnished for regular use to the insured
or a member of the same household. But on the question of the meaning
of the term "a member of the same household" the court took the position
that since the provisions involved were ones avoiding liability on the
coverage afforded, they would be construed most strictly against the insurer.
Since the grandmother (whose car the insured was using at the time of the
accident) was only temporarily living at the insured's house, she was held
not to be a member of the same household. The court held that if the insurer intended to exclude coverage in such circumstances it should have
used more restrictive language.

9. 331 S.W.2d 633 (Mo. 1960).
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